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I. H istory

of

Conflicts Between M ining Regulation

and

Takings L aw

N o discussion o f the takings doctrine would be complete without a thorough review o f
its im pact and relevance to the mining industry, for many o f the most im portant takings law
cases have involved mining operations. Perhaps the most famous o f all o f these was the decision
by Justice Holm es in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. M ahon, 260 U .S. 393 (1922) which ushered in
the era o f the regulatory takings law. Pennsylvania Coal involved a challenge to the Kohler Act,
a state statute which forbade, in certain circumstances, the mining o f coal which caused surface
subsidence o f the land overlying buildings and other structures.

In striking down the
r

Pennsylvania statute, Justice Holm es offered what is perhaps the most frequently cited passage
o f any takings law case: ”[W ]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."

at 415.

Just how far is "too far" is a

question which has perplexed courts and legal scholars alike for many decades.
The difficulty in answering this question is perhaps best illustrated by the C ourt’s 1987
decision in K eystone Bitum inous Coal A ssociation v. D eBenedictis, 480 U .S . 470 (1987). The
facts in K eystone Bitum inous are rem arkably sim ilar to the facts in Pennsylvania Coal. That
case involved another Pennsylvania state statute which was designed to lim it surface subsidence
from underground coal mining. In particular, coal operators w ere prohibited from removing
more than 50% o f the coal resources which were located under certain protected structures. A
five m em ber m ajority o f the Court sustained the law, distinguishing the Pennsylvania Coal case
in two im portant respects; first the Court found that the statute in K eystone Bitum inous was
clearly enacted under the state’s police powers to protect broad public interests including
preserving the property tax base, prom oting public safety, and in protecting w ater resources.
By contrast, the court characterized the statute involved in Pennsylvania Coal as having been
enacted to prom ote private property interests.

Second, the C ourt held that the 50% rule

established by the state statute did not go "too far" since there was no evidence that coal mining
became com m ercially im practical as a result o f the rule. This contrasted with a contrary finding
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in Pennsylvania Coal.
The Suprem e Court had previously addressed the com m ercial im practicality issue in
G oldblatt v. Town o f H em pstead, 369 U .S. 590 (1962). G oldblatt involved a town ordinance
which prohibited excavations below the water table, thus effectively foreclosing G oldblatt’s sand
and gravel mining operation. Goldblatt argued that the ordinance effectively prevented it from
continuing its business and thus constituted a taking. The Court conceded that the ordinance
prohibited a beneficial use to which the property was previously devoted, but held that, where
the ordinance is a valid exercise o f the police pow er, a regulation that "deprives the property
o f its most beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional." Id. at 594. The C ourt noted that
the fact that the use o f the soil itself was precluded, as opposed to a use upon the soil, was not
controlling, nor was the fact that the "use prohibited is arguably not a com m on-law nuisance."
Id. The Court did, however, comment on common-law nuisance as a foundation for regulatory
validity, thus foreshadowing the decision in Lucas v. South Carolina C oastal Council, 112 S.C t.
2886 (1992): "A prohibition simply upon the use o f property for purposes that are declared, by
valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety o f the com m unity, cannot, in
any ju st sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation o f property for the public benefit." Id.
at 593.
G oldblatt focused on the validity o f the regulatory ordinance under the police power,
applying the fam iliar standard o f reasonableness. M oreover, the C ourt made clear that debatable
questions o f reasonableness should be left to the legislature. A sim ilar rationale was used less
than a month later in C onsolidated R ock Products Company v. City o f L os A ngeles, 370 P .2d
342 (1962) appeal dism issed, 371 U .S. 36 (1962), to uphold a zoning ordinance that precluded
Consolidated’s sand and gravel operations.

The trial court found the property had no

appreciable economic value for any other purpose. There was testimony before the legislative
body that other uses were practicable, however, it "determined that the prohibited use cannot
be had without injury to others." Id. at 348. The California Suprem e C ourt conceded that "the
value o f the property for any o f the described uses is relatively small if not minimal" when
compared with its value for gravel extraction but affirmed on the grounds that where reasonable
minds might differ the courts should defer to legislative findings. Dism issing Consolidated’s
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reliance on Pennsylvania

,C
oal and other early takings cases, as inapplic

principles o f comprehensive zoning, the court noted that "public welfare and public convenience
do control and are in themselves terms constantly adjusted to m eet new conditions."

at 352.

G oldblatt and C onsolidated emphasize that the regulatory takings doctrine is an evolving
concept, w here the reasonableness o f the regulation and enforcem ent means are prim arily
determined by the legislative branch o f government.
The final mining case which bears review is the 1981 decision in H odel v. Virginia
Surface M ining and Reclam ation A s s ’n, 452 U .S . 264 (1981). H odel is im portant for a simple
proposition: takings claims are "ad hoc" factual inquiries. In H o d e l , M ining Association had
argued that the steep slope provisions o f the federal Surface M ining Control and Reclamation
V

Act (which established strict standards for mining operations on slopes greater than 20°) violated
the takings clause since coal operators simply could not meet the A ct’s strict standards. The
C ourt treated the claim as a "facial challenge" requiring the Court to determ ine whether mere
enactment o f the law constituted a taking. The Surface Mining Act easily survived such scrutiny.
In its decision, however, the Court made clear that closer scrutiny might be afforded where the
law was applied to "particular property" where parties produced "particular estimates o f
economic im pact and ultim ate valuation relevant in the unique circum stances." Id. at 295.

II. T he L ucas D ecision and P rospects
Regulation and T akings L aw

for

F uture Conflicts B etween M ining

It is fairly easy to document the significant im pact that mining regulation has had on the
takings doctrine, and the reasons for this im pact are not particularly surprising. M ining tends
to displace other uses o f land both on and off-site.

Such displacement often results in

government restrictions on the location and manner o f mining — restrictions which in turn lead
to takings claims.
Although it does not itself concern mining, the Supreme C ourt’s recent decision in Lucas
v. South Carolina C oastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992) has special relevance to the
displacement issue which so often arises in mining cases, and thus offers im portant insights into
how the Court may resolve future takings disputes which arise in the context o f mining
operations. In 1988, the South Carolina legislature enacted the Beachfront M anagement Act.
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In enacting this law, the legislature had found, among other things, that the beach/dune system
"provides the basis for a tourism industry that generates approxim ately two-thirds o f South
Carolina’s annual tourism industry revenue" and that development too close to the beach "has
jeopardized the stability o f the beach/dune system, accelerated erosion, and endangered adjacent
property."

Id.at 2897, n.10. The Act prohibited M r. Lucas from developing two lot

he had purchased on a barrier island along the South Carolina coast in 1986.

The South

Carolina Supreme Court denied Lucas’s takings claim , believing itself bound by the uncontested
findings o f the legislature "that new construction in the coastal zone--such as petitioner intended-threatened this public resource." Id. at 2890.
The C ourt reiterated “two discrete categories o f regulatory action as com pensable without
case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support o f the restraint: ... [1]
regulations that compel the property ow ner to suffer a physical ‘invasion’ o f his property ... and
[2] where the regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use o f la n d .” Id. at
2893-94. (The Court did not address partial regulatory takings in L ucas but reiterated that an
“ad hoc factual inquiry” is required where a partial taking is claimed. Id. at 2893, (citng

Penn

Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U .S. 104, 124 (1978).)
In Lucas, the Supreme Court abandoned the harm ful or noxious uses principle relied on
in prior cases as a “touchstone to distinguish regulatory ‘takings’ -- which require compensation
— from regulatory deprivations that do not require com pensation.” Id. at 2899. Justice Scalia
noted “that the distinction between regulation that “prevents harm ful use” and that which
“confers benefits” is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an objective, value-free basis.”
Id. Instead the Court looked to traditional nuisance law to aid in its analysis.

Nuisance law

offers a balancing test that looks to the “degree o f harm to public lands and resources, or
adjacent private property, ... the social value o f the claim ant’s activities and their suitability to
the locality in question, ... and the relative ease with which the alleged harm can be avoided
through measures taken by the claimant and the g o v ern m en t. . . ” Id. at 2900.
W hile the Court stressed “that an affirm ative decree eliminating all economically
beneficial uses may be defended only if an objectively reasonable application o f relevant
precedents would exclude those beneficial uses in the circumstances in which the land is
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presently found” (Id. at 2902, n.18) it left open the possibility that “changed circumstances or
new knowledge may make what was previously permissible no longer so .” Id. at 2901
The C ourt’s “total taking” inquiry does not appear to preclude a total ban on mining
activity, such as that upheld in C onsolidated R ock Products, where a nuisance can be
established; however, Lucas signals an emerging reluctance to defer, without question, to
legislative findings. Additionally, the Court intimated that the antecedent inquiry must be into
the nature o f the ow ner’s estate and its relevant entitlement (Id. at 2899), an inquiry closely
related to the ow ner’s “investment-backed expectations” which “are keenly relevant to takings
analysis generally.”

Id. at 2895.

Thus, w here the subsurface estate is segregated, or

theoretically may be segregated, from the surface estate, a takings claim may be more likely to
succeed. Furtherm ore, in a footnote, the Court appears to suggest that w here the economically
beneficial use o f a substantial portion o f a large holding is precluded by regulation, the property
interest against which the loss may be measured may not include the entire holding. Id. at 2894,
n.7.

III.

Contemporary P roblems Relating

to

M ining Regulation

and

T akings L aw

A. H ard rock m ining: Takings law poses significant issues for those concerned about
hard rock mining reform . Among other things, issues have been raised with respect to taking
away from mining claimants the right o f patent, and limiting all mining in certain areas which
are deemed unsuitable, o r which cannot meet stringent regulatory standards. The governm ent’s
authority to withhold from mining claimants the right to patent has been sustained in at least one
case before the U .S . Court o f Claims.

F
resv. United States, 639

cert, denied, 454 U .S . 827 (1981). According to that court, a vested right to the issuance o f
a patent does not arise until there has been full compliance with procedures set out in the mining
laws.
The closest examples o f how regulatory requirements might infringe upon mining rights
com e from analogous situations under the federal Surface M ining Control and Reclamation Act.
As the H odel case suggests, however, it may be difficult for a person to show that the reform
law, on its face violates the takings clause, whatever that law might say.
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A contemporary

example o f how the debate over mining restrictions is likely to take shape comes from the New
W orld M ine proposed by the Crown Butte M ine Company, at a location ju st outside Yellowstone
National P ark .1 Should the proposed mining operation be disapproved, as som e have advocated,
or should the regulatory burdens be too onerous for a viable mining operation, Crown Butte may
well claim a taking o f its property.
A final issue that will be discussed in the context o f mining law reform concerns the
proposed im position o f m ineral royalty payments. I f royalty paym ents are imposed on what is
already a marginal mining operation, the added cost might well force the operator out o f
business. In this situation, the operator may well claim that the imposition o f royalty payments
effected a taking o f his property.

B. Coal M ining: The debate over takings under the federal Surface M ining Control and
Reclamation Act has matured well beyond that in the hard rock area, and undoubtedly offers
some insight into how those issues will be resolved. Some key takings issues under the federal
Surface M ining Act rem ain, however. These include a longstanding debate over the definition

1 In 1987, Crown Butte Resources Ltd. applied to Montana for a hard-rock mining permit to mine
Henderson Mountain, just outside of Yellowstone National Park, where it discovered 1.7 million ounces
of gold, 11 million ounces of silver and 65,000 tons of copper. If the permit is approved, 350
construction workers would work on the facilities for two years and 175 miners would be employed for
12 to 15 years. Yellowstone Park’s resource management specialist, Stu Coleman, says it would be
“foolish to allow this.” He notes that the tailings impoundment would be on Fisher Creek, a tributary
of the only federally designated wild a scenic river in Wyoming, the Clark’s Fork of the Yellowstone
River. (Gary Gerhardt, W est’s New Battleground Crown B utte’s Plan fo r a Mine Sets O ff White-Hot
Environmental Battle Around Yellowstone Park, Rocky Mountain News, Oct. 3, 1993. Although Crown
Butte spokesperson Mark Whitehead says that “[o]ur mine poses absolutely no risk to Yellowstone
National Park,” and the company proposes to use mechanical milling instead of cyanide leaching to
extract the metals, critics believe the burial of 5.5 million tons of acid-bearing mine tailings could
threaten the Clark’s Fork. Louis Sahagun, Battle Lines Drawn in the Sands Over Mining Near
Yellowstone, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 16, 1993. Crown Butte says the tailing impoundment would be
state-of-the-art, able to withstand a 500-year flood and major earthquakes. Id. EPA engineer Wes
Wilson said “[t]here’s certainly no good site” for the tailings impoundment and the EPA has “urged”
officials to consider other sites. EPA Urges Mining Firm To Change Plan Company Needs Better Place
fo r Tailings Than One Proposed Drainage Near Yellowstone, Rocky Mountain News, May 1, 1994. The
EPA wants more time to finish work on the environmental impact statement for the mine, delaying the
estimated completion of the document until late 1995. EPA Wants Further Study o f Mine Plan Agency
Wants Time To Weigh Each Proposal fo r Montana Gold Operation, Rocky Mountain News, Jan. 14,

1994
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of """""""""'valid existing

'rights (VER). This phrase was used by Congress in SMCRA in an atte

to avoid legislative takings o f private property in those circumstances where lands are designated
as unsuitable for mining. 30 U .S .C . §1272(e). Since the first efforts were made to define the
term in 1979, however, controversy has raged over the proper construction o f the term .2 The
panelists will review the history o f the debate, and suggest the likely direction o f the current
efforts which have been initiated by the new D irector o f the Office o f Surface M ining, Robert
Uram .
The panelists will also review the question left open by the H odel decision referenced
above; that is, the extent to which specific applications o f the restrictions contained in the federal
law m ight lead to valid takings claims. F o r example, if an operator can demonstrate that her
m ineral estate has lost all value because it cannot be extracted in accordance with environmental
standards established by the law, has a taking occurred for which compensation is owed? The
panelists will consider this issue both generally, and in the context o f particular areas where it
is likely to arise, as for example with the stringent steep slope and prim e farmland provisions
o f the law.
Finally , the panelists will discuss the fallout from the W hitney B enefits case. W hitney
Benefits is the ow ner o f 1,327 acres in the Pow der R iver Basin o f W yom ing, including the
appurtenant m ineral rights.

A substantial portion o f the W hitney Benefits coal reserves lie

2 The Office of Surface Mining (OSM) adopted its first VER rule in 1979. Robert Uram, A Critical
Review o f Valid Existing Rights Under SMCRA, 5-WTR Nat. Resources & Env’t 19 (1991) [hereinafter
Review] Under the rule "(1) all existing mining operations, (2) all mining operations which had applied
for and received ’all permits’ needed to mine by August 3, 1977, and (3) lands on which coal was both
needed for, and immediately adjacent to, an ongoing surface coal mining operation for which all permits
were obtained prior to August 3, 1977" were considered valid existing rights. Id. The rule, along with
hundreds of other regulations, was challenged in In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation,
14 E.R.C. 1083 (D.D.C. 1980). The court held that "a good faith attempt to obtain all permits before
the August 3, 1877 cutoff should suffice for meeting the all permits test." Id. at 1090-92. In 1983, the
"all permits rule was abandoned and replaced with a fifth amendment takings standard which was also
challenged and remanded because it failed to comply with the public notice requirements of the
Administrative Procedures Act. Review. In December 1988, the OSM proposed yet another version of
VER which was formally withdrawn in July of the following year. Review. Finally on Thursday, April
28, 1994, the OSM invited comments on the revision of an environmental impact statement "which
analyzed the environmental impact of the alternatives for rulemakings that would (1) define the term Valid
Existing Rights (VER)." 59 Fed Reg. 21996 (1994). Final action on this new effort will not likely occur
before 1995.

7

beneath an alluvial valley floor (AVF). SMCRA precludes most surface mining within AVFs
in the West. A fter an initial effort to w ork out an exchange o f its coal lands for other federal
coal lands, W hitney Benefits filed a takings claim in the United States Claims Court.

The

Claims Court initially denied the claim; on remand, however, the court found that a taking had
indeed occurred and awarded more than $140 million to W hitney Benefits.

(Whitney Benefits

II), 18 C l.C t. 394 (1989). (The award included prejudgm ent interest from the date o f the taking-enactment o f SM CRA—and attorney’s fees.)

The C ourt o f Appeals for the Federal Circuit

affirmed and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. W hitney B enefits, Inc. v. U nited States, 926
F .2d 1169 (Fed.C ir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.C t. 406 (1991). In February 1994, the Court
o f Federal Claims held that W hitney was entitled to receive interest compounded annually, rather
than simple interest, as ju st compensation for the taking. W hitney B enefits Inc. v. U nited States,
30 F ed.C l. 411 (1994). Finally, in April 1994, the governm ent was denied its motion for a new
trial, which alleged that evidence proffered in the apportionm ent proceeding cast doubt upon the
fairness and accuracy o f the court’s valuation. W hitney B enefits Inc. v. U nited States, 1994 W L
163855.
The substantial encroachment on the federal purse that is supported by the W hitney
Benefits decision suggests another im portant takings law issue: To what extent should the
government o r the claim ant be able to choose the rem edy -- invalidation o f the regulation or
compensation — for a violation o f the takings clause. In the W hitney B enefits case, given the
costs involved, the federal government might well have preferred to allow mining to go forward
rather than enforcing the regulation that otherwise applied. But in most takings cases, neither
the government nor the private party likely have much choice as to the rem edy. This conclusion
follows from the Supreme C ourt’s decision in Preseault v. IC C , 494 U .S . 1 (1990). Presault
involved the constitutionality o f the federal "rails to trails" statute. The C ourt refused to address
the merits o f Preseault’s takings claim, instead holding that Preseault’s rem edy, if any, was in
the Federal Claims Court under the Tucker Act.

In so holding, the C ourt appears to have

relegated most takings cases into that forum . U nder Preseault, the Claims C ourt is the sole
forum for resolving takings claim unless the relevant statute specifically withdraws the Tucker
Act remedy.

Id at
. 12

Since few enactments mention the Tucker Act, or the ap
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remedy in an alleged takings situation, virtually all takings claims appear destined for the Claims
Court.

Aside from the policy implications o f this rule, the Preseault decision may pose

problems for persons challenging the imposition o f government regulations.
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